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Abstract 
 
Design competitions are often used to select design teams for high profile 
development projects, yet have received scant attention in the literature. Seeking to 
redress this imbalance, this paper presents a competition model that was employed 
on Toronto’s waterfront in 2006 for a large public realm project and describes how it 
was structured around an iterative public consultation process. Although subject to a 
number of implementation delays, the competition sponsors built a constituency of 
support for the redevelopment project by taking the unusual step of engaging lay 
people in the decision-making process. The paper argues that the competition struck 
a balance between lay input and professional knowledge and contends that future 
research efforts should continue to explore means by which public participation can 
be integrated into design competitions. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the Renaissance, design competitions have been employed by public agencies 
and private sponsors to select the designers of important public buildings and new 
civic spaces (Lipstadt 2003). In some countries, notably France, public agencies are 
obliged to hold design competitions for projects requiring large amounts of public 
funding (Cabanieu 1994; Loew 1994). While in many other Western nations design 
competitions are actively encouraged as tools of ‘design excellence’ (Ollswang 1990; 
Pantel 1994; Punter 2005; Spreiregen 1979) and regulated by the various bodies that 
govern the design professions (e.g. AIA 2011; RIBA, 2013). 
 
Despite this, the literature on urban design policy and practice has tended to ignore 
the role that design competitions play in shaping the built environment. The small 
body of research available is relatively limited and debates about the effectiveness of 
the competition method, both in architecture and urban design, remain inconclusive 
(Volker 2010). One recurring argument is that design competitions are a public-
spirited method for delivering design excellence (Larson 1994; Spreiregen 1979; Van 
Wezemael 2011), yet there is also evidence that competition decision-making 
processes, where an expert jury chooses the winning entry, leave little room for 
public input and lead to results that are often unsatisfactory to lay people (Nasar 
1999). 
 
Through a case study of a public realm competition convened on Toronto’s 
waterfront in 2006 by the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation (TWRC)1, 
this paper focuses on the relationship between lay people and design experts during 
a design competition. It explores the challenges of introducing more participatory 
means of decision-making before turning to Toronto’s waterfront, where regeneration 
efforts since the 1970s have been characterised by political infighting, over-
development and acute public dissatisfaction (Desfor et al 1989; Filion and 
Sanderson 2011; Laidley 2007). The paper illustrates the competition decision-
making model and describes how it was structured around an iterative community 
participation process that was engineered to ignite local interest in the TWRC’s 
waterfront redevelopment programme. Although an expert jury chose the winning 
design, public exhibitions, a public forum and a stakeholder advisory committee, 
were convened so that local people could influence the competition process. The                                                         
1 The TWRC was rebranded Waterfront Toronto in 2008. For the purposes of this paper the original abbreviation will 
be used throughout. 
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paper contends that the competition reconciled some of the challenges associated 
with jury-led design competitions. While public engagement efforts might have gone 
further, the competition helped the TWRC to establish a constituency of support for 
its redevelopment ambitions and find common ground between the professional 
experts and lay people involved in the competition process. At the same time, 
however, implementation efforts were negatively impacted by political instabilities 
and financial setbacks that resulted in protracted construction delays. The paper 
concludes with a critical examination of the competition decision-making model and 
offers a series of lessons that might be applied to future design competitions. 
 
The research was conducted as a single qualitative case study and formed part of a 
wider investigation of an emerging design-led planning agenda on Toronto’s 
waterfront, conducted between 2009 and 2012. By calling upon a range of data 
sources, case studies allow for the judicious interpretation of real-life situations (Yin 
2003) and, in this instance, provided a delineated framework to situate the 
personalities of the actors and institutions involved in the design competition process. 
Although case studies have long been stigmatised for their apparent failure to offer 
scientific generalisations (Stake 1995; Yin 2003), this research embraces the 
contrary perspective which contends that data-rich cases can maximise knowledge 
and emphasise particularisation thereby yielding rich transferable information 
(Flyvbjerg 2001; Stake 1995).  
 
Three sources of triangulated qualitative data were collected during the research 
fieldwork. Fifty semi-structured interviews with representatives from the TWRC, the 
City of Toronto, designers and members of the local community provided the 
personal accounts of the Toronto waterfront story, while over 300 documents and 
archival data, ranging from planning reports and architectural drawings to meeting 
minutes and press reports, were used to piece together the design and planning 
processes; direct observations were also conducted. The verbal, textual and visual 
data was analysed using content analysis and the interview subjects were coded to 
protect their unanimity. A brief description of the codes employed in this paper can 
be found in the appendix.  
 
Unpacking urban design competitions 
 
As one of the preferred methods for choosing designers on projects of “exceptional 
prominence” (Lipstadt 2003, 396), competitions are widely recognised as laboratories 
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for aesthetic and spatial design experimentation (Larson 1994; Lipstadt 1989; 
Malmberg 2006). Competitions tend to attract numerous, and often innovative, 
proposals for complex design problems and, as a result, the decision to sponsor a 
design competition, typically made by a public agency or a wealthy private sponsor, 
is frequently motivated by publicity. Competitions regularly elicit the interest of 
international design teams and celebrity architects, provoking media attention and 
generating public curiosity (Sudjic 2006). This can cultivate a constituency of public 
support and political capital for a project and reduce the risk assumed by the sponsor 
(Malmberg 2006; Sagalyn 2006). For designers, competitions can also be irresistible. 
Although winning is rare, even shortlisted proposals can attract clients and lead to 
commissions (Banerjee and Loukaitou-Sideris 1990; Larson 1994). 
 
Urban design competitions hold much in common with those for architecture and 
landscape architecture projects (Eley 1990). Typically, a brief will establish the vision 
and objectives of the competition, an independent jury of experts will be appointed to 
select the winning entry and, although every competition is slightly different, the 
competition sponsor will specify whether the competition is ‘open’ to all qualified 
designers, ‘limited’ by certain criteria (such as age or registered profession), or be by 
‘invitation’ only (Alexander and Witzling 1990; Lehrer 2011). The competition sponsor 
also decides whether the competition will conclude with a showcase of ideas, or 
eventually lead to a built project (Lehrer 2011; Lipstadt 2006; Spreiregen 1979). 
 
Despite these similarities, some important distinctions can be drawn between 
architecture and urban design competitions. First is the subject matter. Although 
architecture competitions often incorporate public realm components, especially on 
large civic projects, the design juries inevitably focus their attention on the 
creativeness of the building envelope and its visual impact on the site (Alexander et 
al. 1987). In contrast, urban design competitions are, by their very nature, more 
spatially dispersed. Ranging from district wide masterplans to public realm proposals, 
they almost always include a combination of architectural and non-architectural 
elements that can be tackled at a variety of scales (Sagalyn 2006). This leads to a 
second difference: urban design competitions generally require the skills of a 
multidisciplinary consultancy team, rather than an individual designer or team of 
designers. Most urban design problems demand strategic spatial thinking that 
challenges the existing layout of the urban fabric at a neighbourhood or district wide 
scale (Lehrer 2011). In addition to architects and landscape architects, the 
participants in an urban design competition often include a diverse group of 
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professionals who can address issues such as historic conservation, morphology, 
transportation, urban infrastructure and real estate (Eley 1990; Sagalyn 2006).  
 
Whatever the differences, the one consistent theme amongst all design competitions 
is their political sensitivity. Whether a competition is held for a building, a park, 
memorial or a neighbourhood master plan, design ideologies and passions collide; 
public and private interests interweave and the problem(s) identified are often as 
much about local or regional politics as they are about finding an innovative design 
solution for a building, space or neighbourhood. As Sagalyn argues, design 
competitions “…are commissioned for many reasons, almost none of which have to 
do with design and all of which have to do with political motivation” (2006, 29). 
 
Participation and design competitions 
 
By offering “a variety of proposals and innovative ideas to a jury” (Lehrer 2011, 305), 
competitions extend opportunities for design engagement beyond standard 
consultation exercises. The extra layer of evaluation provided by a jury has the 
potential to generate a more open decision-making environment (Lehrer 2011). It is 
common for design competitions to include some form of public engagement. Many 
competition sponsors organise public exhibitions and often a book, or review 
document, is published to record the results for posterity (e.g. Arnell and Bickford 
1984; 1984a; De Haan and Haagsma 1988; Mansour 2003). A growing number of 
blogs and websites also promote competitions and offer commentary on the results 
(e.g. competition.org, ribacompetitions.com, thecompetitionsblog.com) and, in some 
instances, competition sponsors hold public consultation exercises before the 
competition brief is written to inform the jury’s selection process (Cabanieu 1994). 
Nevertheless, much of the existing academic literature has tended to focus on 
historical analyses of past competitions for iconic architectural projects, memorials 
and civic spaces (e.g. Lipstadt 1989; 2003; Solomonson 2001) as well as descriptive 
instructions – almost like ‘practice guides’ – of different competition models (e.g. 
Spreiregen 1979; Strong 1976). With a particular focus on Scandinavian practice, a 
further and informative area of research explores how the dialogue between 
sponsors, competitors and the jury might be enhanced if participants interact with 
each other and with the judges during the competition (Kreiner et al. 2011). 
 
Despite these trends, substantive research on the engagement tools used during 
design competitions remains relatively limited. This is particularly alarming because 
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numerous competitions have been criticised for raising public expectations, failing to 
engage local people and leading to unfinished or poorly conceived projects (Nasar 
1999; Sagalyn 2006). Banerjee and Loukaitou-Sideris share Lehrer’s earlier stated 
view that design competitions can be relatively open and add that there is something 
“civic-minded, and public spirited” (1990, 116) about the format. They appear to cast 
the design competition method as an event that “catches the fancy of lay people” 
(ibid.). Similarly, Lipstadt argues that “Competitions encourage those who only 
observe, including the public, to applaud or admonish architects as if designers were 
contending in a public tournament” (1989, 9). Yet, while it might be true that public 
appreciation for design should be celebrated, the idea that competitions are events at 
which lay people merely marvel at the ingenuity of the designer sets a dangerous 
precedent. It is thus important to remember that design competitions have the 
potential to play a positive role in dialogues about the appropriateness and design 
potential of new spaces and places in cities.. 
 
In an instructive study that offers one of the few detailed accounts of the participatory 
potential of design competitions, Nasar (1999) argues that a sizable gulf regarding 
the nature of ‘good design’ tends to exists between lay people and design experts, 
both during and after a competition. In his analysis of an architectural design 
competition for the Wexner Center, a public arts facility at Ohio State University, 
Nasar (1999) describes how the winning entry by Peter Eisenman divided opinion. 
Assessed by an influential jury and beating off stiff competition from three world-class 
architects, the design was simultaneously extolled by the creative elite and 
admonished by the general public, many of whom found aspects of the final design 
challenging. Reflecting on his findings, Nasar argues that competitions should be 
recast as ‘democratic opportunities’ in which jury deliberations are informed by lay 
opinion about the meaning of the project. Not only would this enhance transparency, 
he contends, it would also reduce the likelihood that the expert jury misjudge local 
sentiment.  
 
Nasar’s view is shared by Banerjee and Loukaitou-Sideris who contend that user 
participation, especially before the jury deliberates, can provide both the competitors 
and the jury members with important insights into the “social, political, or behavioural 
aspects of the design problem” (1990, 128). They admit, however, that involving lay 
people in the competition design process is more challenging and posit whether 
users could be invited to sit on the design jury to decrease the communication gap 
between experts and lay people.  
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Engineering a precipitous shift towards more participatory means of decision-making 
remains a challenging proposition because the professional bodies that regulate 
competitions, such as the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) and the 
American Institute of Architects (AIA), regard the primacy of the expert jury as a 
defining component of the design competition method (AIA 2011; RIBA 2013). With 
this in mind, it is crucial to continue exploring, not necessarily how to directly replace 
expert juries, but how to better integrate the views of lay people into the competition 
decision-making process. To examine this further, the paper now turns to the case of 
an urban design competition on Toronto’s waterfront where political and financial 
pressures have attracted the attention of local people for many decades. 
Constructing a model of the competition process (see Figure 3), the case reveals 
how a gentle balance was struck between engaging lay people throughout the 
competition while retaining the professional input of an expert design jury. 
 
The Toronto Waterfront Innovative Design Competition 
 
Held in 2006, the Toronto Waterfront Innovative Design Competition was sponsored 
by the TWRC, a quasi-autonomous agency created in 2001 by three levels of 
government (local, provincial and federal) to redevelop Toronto’s vast post-industrial 
waterfront (see Figure 1). Since the 1970s, the waterfront’s redevelopment had been 
characterised by quixotic planning visions and piecemeal interventions (Desfor et al 
1989; Gordon 1996). Political pressures led to short-term solutions and, during the 
1980s, much of the public land on the waterfront was sold to private developers. The 
quality of subsequent redevelopment efforts ranged significantly and, as a result, the 
waterfront became a fragmented place. 
 
In response, a redevelopment moratorium was issued in the late 1980s and a blue 
ribbon commission was established to rethink the waterfront’s future. Recognising 
the public’s disatisfication with the quality of previous redevelopment efforts, the 
‘Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront’ used roundtable 
meetings with government agencies, community representatives and private sector 
stakeholders to inform its planning efforts. In 1992, it released a wide-ranging report 
that focused on sustainability and supported mixed-use redevelopment and improved 
public access to the waterfront (Laidley 2007). The Commission also pointed to 
fragmented landownership amongst various government agencies as a hindrance to 
any coordinated planning effort (Filion and Sanderson 2011). Although its findings 
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were generally well received, academic observers called into question the 
accessibility of the Commission’s public participation efforts and argued that the 
stakeholder roundtable meetings tended to privilege private sector interests and 
failed to “ameliorate differential power relations” (Laidley 2007, 266).  
 
One of the Commission’s chief recommendations was that a focused organisation be 
established to coordinate future redevelopment on the waterfront. This took the form 
of the Waterfront Regeneration Trust. During the 1990s, the Trust continued the 
Commission’s commitment to stakeholder consultation (Laidley 2007), but ultimately 
oversaw little major redevelopment work. One important change that did occur during 
this period, however, was the consolidation of public sector landownership on the 
waterfront amongst a smaller group of government agencies (Filion and Sanderson 
2011). 
 
The next significant boost for the waterfront came in 1999 when a private-sector led 
Task Force was created and charged with producing a renewed vision for the 
waterfront that would build upon the work of the Trust while also supporting the city’s 
bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The Task Force was incorporated as the Toronto 
Waterfront Revitalization Corporation (TWRC) in 2001 and guaranteed equal 
financial contributions of $500 million from the three levels of government to 
implement its design-led redevelopment vision. The new corporation was dominated 
by private sector financiers and high profile urban designers who had experience 
managing large-scale masterplanning projects, and early assessments of the TWRC 
were critical of its apparent failure to engage local people in the waterfront planning 
process. (Lehrer and Laidley 2008). 
 
As the corporation has become more established this perception has begun to 
change and the corporation has more recently appeared to place a high premium on 
engagement with local residents (Eidelman 2011). In particular, it has interacted 
meaningfully with a group of community representatives, who themselves have 
developed an articulate vision and rigorous understanding of the design and planning 
challenges facing the waterfront. Critical observers note, however, that the TWRC 
still fails to communicate successfully with residents of “poorer inner-city 
neighbourhoods…, or with people living in the increasingly impoverished outlying 
areas of the city” (Lehrer and Laidley 2008, 796). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Competition Background 
 
Toronto is famed for its vibrant inner city neighbourhoods and the Toronto Waterfront 
Innovative Design Competition was, in part, a response to the uncharacteristically 
poor quality of the waterfront public realm. Little more than 750 metres separate the 
dense skyscrapers of Toronto’s financial district from Lake Ontario, but a wide 
railway corridor and an elevated highway tear them apart. Pedestrians and road 
users alike have to negotiate underpasses, busy intersections and a cacophony of 
highway noise before reaching the water’s edge and, on arrival, the conditions only 
marginally improve (see Figure 2). The principal waterfront street, Queens Quay, is a 
wide and busy thoroughfare that incorporates a heavily engineered branch of the 
city’s streetcar line. High-rise construction has also encroached on the water’s edge 
and little attempt has been made to sustain a continuous waterfront promenade or 
celebrate the visual connections between the city and the water. When the 
competition was initiated this problem was particularly acute at the ‘slip heads’, 
former harbour moorings located at the termination of the city’s major north-south 
streets, where only crash barriers and wire fences demarcated the historically 
important transition between the port and the city (see Figure 2). 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The decision to launch a competition and address the problems associated with the 
waterfront public realm was spearheaded by the TWRC’s newly-appointed vice-
president of planning and design, who brought experience managing competitions 
from a previous role at the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation in New York. 
From the outset, the competition had a strong political motive. Since its creation in 
2001, the corporation had struggled to implement many of its planning proposals 
because of financial disputes between the three levels of government, which, at one 
point during the summer of 2004, had brought it to the brink of bankruptcy (Eidelman 
2011). The TWRC’s financial difficulties were stabilised somewhat during late 2004 
and it was therefore keen to move expeditiously towards implementation. As a senior 
executive remonstrated, the TWRC had to demonstrate to politicians and local 
people that the waterfront redevelopment programme was progressing, otherwise the 
corporation was doomed to failure (CORP 8). The TWRC board of directors 
announced its approval of the competition in November 2005 and stated that it would 
tackle the problem of connectivity between the city and the water, while creating a 
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‘signature,’ or brand, that would demonstrate the corporation’s commitment to the 
waterfront’s long-term future (TWRC 2006). 
 
The Design Competition Process 
 
The competition decision-making model is depicted in Figure 3 and illustrates the 
four major phases and eleven stages of the competition. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Phase 1: Competition Qualification 
 
Stage one of the first phase of the competition began with the composition of a 
design brief by the TWRC’s internal design team. This reinforced a long-standing 
aspiration of the City of Toronto, to “knit everything together as one cohesive urban 
fabric that would create something on a great civic scale” (CORP 3). The brief was 
also notable for its comprehensiveness. Instead of a theoretical abstract encouraging 
‘outside of the box’ thinking, as is often issued on design competitions (Eley 1990), it 
set out, over some fifty pages, the corporation’s planning strategy as well as a 
detailed urban design framework (TWRC 2006). The brief also incorporated a far-
reaching site analysis that drew upon many earlier planning analyses of the 
waterfront (City of Toronto 2001; TWRC 2003).  
 
The TWRC was keen to see innovative design responses that might 
“overcome...existing visual noise and create a sense of interconnectedness and 
identity” (TWRC 2006, 5). In particular, the brief challenged the functionality of 
Queens Quay by promoting new ‘gateways’ at the waterfront slip heads and 
anticipated the realisation of a continuous waterfront promenade (TWRC 2006). The 
thinking behind the competition design strategy was ultimately quite simple: although 
innovative conceptual ideas were sought, considerable planning work and supporting 
public consultation had already been conducted and there was little desire to 
‘reinvent the wheel’. As a result, this first stage of the competition did not include any 
opportunities for public engagement. By providing a clear design context and well-
defined parameters, explained one of the authors of the brief, the TWRC could 
expect the design teams to act more creatively to solve the problems that had 
already been identified while, at the same time, raising the public profile of the project 
(CORP 3). 
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In addition to setting out the competition design challenges, the brief also made clear 
that opportunities for public engagement would be created later in the decision-
making process. More specifically it stated that a combination of stakeholder 
committee meetings and open public forums would directly inform the selection 
process, although an independent jury of experts would ultimately choose the 
winning team (TWRC 2006). Describing how this would work in practice, a senior 
urban designer at the TWRC explained that: “It was not a case of ‘pick the nicest 
design from an architect’, it was a case of ‘you, as design professionals and planning 
professionals [the jury], should be understanding of what it is the community wants 
and help them to select a plan that achieves their goals’ ” (CORP 3). The proposed 
decision-making model reaffirmed the TWRC’s desire to elicit public support for the 
project and, at the same time, put into practice a wider strategic commitment towards 
“effective two-way communications with members of the public…[that would]…Build 
constituency trust and support for the Corporation” (TWRC 2002a, 4).  
 
The procedure of interweaving large open public forums with stakeholder advisory 
groups was a TWRC initiative that aimed to straddle the divide between experts and 
lay people and encourage conflict resolution, education and the sharing of 
professional and community knowledge. Mirroring, in part, the approach employed a 
decade earlier by the blue ribbon commission, the iterative process also appears to 
have emerged out of early discussions between the TWRC’s leadership team and 
local community leaders representing the West Don Lands Committee, a vibrant 
neighbourhood organisation with a long history of grassroots planning leadership on 
and around the waterfront (West Don Lands Committee 1999). The TWRC now 
employs this process on all of its masterplanning and construction projects, including 
design competitions. 
 
Using this formula, the TWRC planned for a series of six competition exhibitions to 
be held at locations across Toronto, as well as a large public forum (TWRC 2006b). 
The ‘Central Waterfront Stakeholder Committee’ was also convened with the specific 
objective of consolidating “the many different voices with an interest in the waterfront” 
(TWRC 2006, 30). Representatives from a cross-section of organisations were 
invited to take part. These included: the local community associations representing 
residents on the waterfront and in adjacent neighbourhoods, local businesses 
operating within the competition area and advocacy groups such as the Waterfront 
Regeneration Trust. To support the design competition process on technical matters, 
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a City of Toronto expert advisory team was also convened. Their task was to offer 
counsel to the jury on the regulatory challenges that might be encountered with 
respect to planning, engineering and transportation by each of the shortlisted 
proposals (TWRC 2006).  
 
The brief made clear that the TWRC wanted the competition to lead to both 
conceptual ideas, as well as a detailed public realm masterplan. The competition 
thus took the basic form of a two-stage implementation competition condensed over 
six months. In February 2006, the second stage of the competition was initiated by 
the release of a detailed request for qualifications (RFQ) – an abridged version of the 
competition brief – and an open call for competitors (see Figure 3). In accordance 
with provincial regulations, the only stipulation was that each team include a Toronto 
‘partner’ with the necessary registration to practice architecture or landscape 
architecture in Ontario (TWRC 2006a). The RFQ set out the competition goals and 
objectives and outlined the timetable and assessment criteria for the competition. 
Interested teams were asked to produce an initial design concept and highlight their 
previous experience with public space design, sustainability, transportation 
infrastructure and community engagement (ibid.). 38 multidisciplinary teams from 
fifteen different countries responded.  
 
During March 2006 the competition moved to the third stage and each submission 
was assessed against the aforementioned criteria by an internal panel comprising 
four design experts from the TWRC and the City of Toronto (TWRC 2006a). Sitting 
on the panel were the corporation’s vice president of planning and design, the head 
of the TWRC Waterfront Design Review Panel and, from the City of Toronto, the 
manager of waterfront parks and the urban design director. Once again, the decision-
making process remained firmly in the hands of design experts. Based on this 
internal assessment, five shortlisted teams spanning an international gamut were 
invited to proceed to the fourth stage of the competition:  
 
• Foster and Partners (UK) and Atelier Deiseitl (Germany) 
• Stan Allen Architects and Sarah Whiting and Ron Witte Architects (USA) 
• Tod Williams Billie Tsien Architects (USA) and Martinez Lapena-Torres 
(Spain) 
• West 8 (The Netherlands) and du Toit Allsopp Hillier (Canada) 
• Snøhetta (Norway), Sasaki Associates, nARCHITECTS, Weisz + Yoes 
Architecture, H3, Balmori Associates, Halcrow Yolles HPA (USA) 
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Phase 2: Intensive Design (6 Weeks) 
 
At the start of the second phase of the competition the shortlisted teams were issued 
with the competition brief, given an honourarium of $30,000 to cover expenses 
related to the competition and invited to tour the waterfront before beginning work on 
their submissions (TWRC 2006). Although the primary aim of the brief was to seek 
proposals for a complete public realm masterplan, the initial implementation objective 
was less ambitious. The brief made clear that funding was only available for a series 
of design interventions at the eight slip heads that had originally been proposed in a 
document called the Central Waterfront Public Space Framework (TWRC 2003). 
Approximately $20 million was reserved for this intervention and the corporation 
admitted that “Other components may or may not be pursued at the same time 
depending upon a variety of factors, including availability of funding, timing, or related 
development projects, and need for further design work” (TWRC 2006a, 16). 
Nevertheless, the design teams were still instructed to consider the entire project in 
their proposals. In some respects, this was a clever decision. If the winning entry was 
well-received, heightened public support might encourage further funding 
commitments from the three levels of government. Yet it was also a big risk because 
the corporation would inevitably find it hard to sustain interest in its wider 
redevelopment aims if funding was delayed or unforthcoming. 
 
The five shortlisted design teams were given a short six-week window during April 
and May 2006 to produce their submissions. Halfway through, at stage five of the 
competition (see Figure 3), they presented their ideas to the local stakeholder 
committee, the City of Toronto advisory team and TWRC design staff at a mid-term 
review. During the subsequent sixth stage, the design teams were expected to react 
to the mid-term review and develop a final proposal.  
 
Phase 3: Public Feedback (2 Weeks) 
 
Following the competition deadline on May 11th 2006 (stage seven), the competition 
moved to its third phase and was opened to comment at a widely publicised public 
forum. This eighth stage of the competition was convened on May 15th 2006 in 
downtown Toronto (TWRC 2006) and each of the shortlisted teams were given 15 
minutes to present their design proposals. The forum attendees then had an 
opportunity to view the submissions and speak to the designers. Over the following 
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two weeks, the shortlisted proposals were presented at six public exhibitions. 
Together these events proved pivotal. Over 500 people attended the forum and more 
than 300 comment cards were left at the public exhibitions (TWRC 2006b). A 
detailed record of the individual attendees was not kept, but data available from 
similar proceedings held by the TWRC suggest that the corporation’s public events 
attract a large number of active members of local community associations based 
close to the waterfront, members of the Toronto design community (professional 
architects and planners, etc.), representatives from local advocacy group and, 
invariably, local graduate students interested in urban issues (e.g. TWRC 2003a). 
Attendance from communities located further away from the waterfront is typically 
much lower (Lehrer and Laidley 2008). Responding to this problem, and with the aim 
of re-establishing the waterfront as a “city-wide asset” (TWRC 2006b, 1), the 
corporation purposefully organised the ninth stage of the competition at sites across 
Toronto so that people residing away from the waterfront could get involved. The 
exhibitions and the public forum were publicised through paid advertising, media 
coverage and the TWRC’s newsletter. The results were written up in a public report 
to the jury (TWRC 2006b). 
 
The public events provided local people who were not directly involved in the 
stakeholder consultation process an opportunity to play an active role in the 
competition. In addition, the TWRC used the events to showcase the steps being 
taking towards implementation, as well as their commitment to community 
engagement. From the perspective of the Toronto Star’s architecture critic, 
Christopher Hume, the public forum was a great success. “Judging from the crowds 
that showed up daily at BCE Place, where architectural models were on exhibit as 
well as drawings, this competition has succeed in generating some genuine 
excitement,” he wrote, “God knows this sense of engagement will take some getting 
used to” (2006, B04). To coincide with the public exhibition, the Toronto Star also 
conducted an online poll, which asked attendees to vote on their favourite of the five 
submissions. 4,840 readers took part and the results were included in the report 
given to the jury (TWRC 2006b). 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The five shortlisted submissions ranged in style and approach (see Figure 4). 
Norman Foster’s team emphasised the eight slip heads with a series of piers and 
iconic teardrop-shaped pavilions (TWRC 2006c). Many of the attendees at the public 
exhibitions liked these sculptural pavilions, while some were attracted to Foster’s 
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celebrity and believed he could be trusted to deliver a brilliant project (TWRC 2006b). 
Nevertheless, there was also concern that the design was too iconic. Christopher 
Hume (2006) noted, for example, that the proposal was dubbed ‘Dubai lite’ by some 
forum attendees. The entry by the first group of US architects, led by Stan Allen, also 
imagined a series of pavilions on the water’s edge, in this instance constructed from 
glass and termed ‘cultural buoys’ (TWRC 2006c). One member of the public 
commented that the design was ‘ “startling” and “creative” and…would ‘rival 
waterfronts around the world” ’ (in TWRC 2006b, 3), while another worried that the 
design was “reminiscent of 60s-style urban planning disasters” (ibid.). The other 
American submission, by Tod Williams’ team, received praise from exhibition 
attendees for the steps taken to integrate public transit with the natural environment, 
but was also widely criticised for proposing a series of new manmade islands in the 
Inner Harbour (TWRC 2006b). The two most celebrated entries were those by the 
European-led landscape architecture teams, the first by Norwegian firm Snøhetta 
and the second by the Dutch firm West 8, working in collaboration with Toronto-
based du Toit Allsopp Hillier (DTAH). Both were praised for their consideration of the 
existing environment and the emphasis they had placed on a continuous waterfront 
promenade. Albeit a rather crude sample, the West 8/DTAH scheme garnered the 
most votes in the Toronto Star’s online poll with 30% support followed closely by 
Snøhetta who garnered 28% (TWRC 2006b). 
 
Phase 4: Expert Assessment and Results 
 
The fourth and final phase of the competition began at the end of May when the jury 
began its deliberations (see Figure 3). lt was comprised of six design experts from 
diverse disciplines; the Toronto architect Brigitte Shim was appointed as the chair 
and was supported by landscape architect Claude Cormier, urban designer Ken 
Greenberg, New York architect Lise Anne Couture, film maker Atom Egoyan and 
Bruce Mau, a Toronto-based graphic artist and brand designer. A senior urban 
designer at the corporation reflects that the kaleidoscope of talent on the jury was 
intentional. It was selected by the TWRC’s design team with leadership from the 
corporation’s vice president of planning and design; the public did not play a 
selection role. The vice president and his team chose a group of experts that were 
likely to take city building principles into account, but by inviting a film maker and 
graphic artist to join the panel as well, they also reinforced the corporation’s market-
orientated desire to use art and design to brand the waterfront and, at the same time, 
demonstrate to the general public that the corporation was keen to channel a broad 
 17 
range of ideas for the waterfront that did not focus soley on architectural and urban 
design expertise. As a senior urban designer at the TWRC explains, “I like to get 
more than just architects on these things because otherwise the architects just talk 
about architecture to each other” (CORP 8). 
 
The jury were asked to assess the proposals using the design principles contained in 
the competition brief and the feedback compiled from the public events and the 
stakeholder advisory committee (TWRC 2006). Their report was released by the end 
of the month (TWRC 2006c). Complimenting all the teams for producing “a 
remarkable amount of exemplary work” (TWRC 2006c, 3), the report described how 
the jury had looked for a design solution that offered a bold vision, but could also be 
implemented quickly. With unanimity, and mirroring the sentiment of both local 
people and the stakeholder advisory group, the jury chose the entry by the team led 
by West 8. The runner-up position was awarded to the team led by Snøhetta. A 
member of one of the local neighbourhood associations involved in the Central 
Waterfront Stakeholder Committee remembers, “we chose the company...the one 
that won we liked. They had sort of a European sensibility. It introduced something 
completely new to Toronto” (CIVIL 4).  
 
Although not explicitly described as such in the jury’s report, this ‘European 
sensibility’ likely stemmed from the team’s simple and consistent approach to the 
public realm and the emphasis it placed on civic scale over architectural frivolity. The 
West 8/DTAH team had responded well to the TWRC’s competition brief and, in 
particular, the problem of fragmentation. To engineer the facelift of Queen Quay, the 
winning entry proposed a series of simple yet dramatic design moves: remove two 
lanes of traffic, transform the surface under the streetcar lines into a carpet of grass, 
continue the Martin Goodman Trail2 along Queens Quay, widen the sidewalk and 
plant a dense glade of trees to demarcate pedestrian, cycle and vehicular space. At 
the eight spit heads, the team proposed a series of sculptural wooden decks, quickly 
coined the ‘wave decks’, to act as anchoring public spaces. Each was envisaged 
slightly differently, but remained part of a consistent fabric that connected the north-
south termini streets at the slips with both Queens Quay and the water’s edge (see 
Figure 5).  
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE                                                         
2 The Martin Goodman Trail is part of a longer Toronto lakefront bike trail. the Central Waterfront section is yet to be 
completed.  
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Implementing the Central Waterfront Masterplan 
 
In their report, the jury urged the TWRC to give the winning design team a much 
fuller implementation mandate than imagined in the brief, arguing that any initial 
efforts should be more broadly focused on a strip of Queens Quay and the waterfront 
promenade, rather than the slip heads alone. This would demonstrate how the entire 
proposal might work and  “ensure that the citizens of Toronto see immediate action” 
(TWRC 2006c, 9). Recognising the political capital that could be gained from this and 
hoping to reinforce the public dimension of the competition, the TWRC arranged a 
summer showcase event. For ten days in August 2006 the TWRC closed a stretch of 
Queens Quay and constructed a ‘mock up’ that included the installation of a one-
kilometre lawn, a temporary extension of the Martin Goodman Trail and a lineal 
flowerbed. The response to the event was generally very positive (Hume 2006a). 
 
Sustaining the Competition’s Momentum 
 
During the remainder of 2006 and throughout 2007 and 2008, the West 8/DTAH 
team were contracted to deliver a full masterplan for the Central Waterfront and a 
supporting environmental assessment (EA). Required under provincial law on all 
large infrastructure projects, the EA was conducted in partnership with the City of 
Toronto and was supported by a companion EA process. This was completed by the 
Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) and focused on the streetcar track upgrades that 
were necessary to alter the configuration of Queens Quay. Public engagement 
continued during the two-year process through an ongoing series of iterative 
stakeholder advisory meetings and public forums (Waterfront Toronto 2009). Neither 
of the final EAs recommended any major departure from the shared boulevard 
proposed by the winning team and the provincial government approved the 
assessment process in April 2010 allowing construction to proceed subject to funding 
(Waterfront Toronto 2012). 
 
Due to their smaller size, the wave decks were not subject to the same strict 
regulatory assessment and were allowed to proceed almost immediately. The 
detailed designs for the new wave decks were periodically reviewed by the TWRC’s 
expert Waterfront Design Review Panel (WDRP) as well as by the stakeholder 
committee. One of the members of the winning design team notes that the 
stakeholders “really helped us understand what programmatic things they would like 
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to see more of; the kinds of activities they imagined and the moods they imagined” 
(DESIGN 8). From the outset, the WDRP was also very supportive of the winning 
submission and praised its creativity and simplicity in connecting the city to the lake 
(TWRC 2006d). The panel’s critical commentary, albeit relatively minor, was 
reserved for the more technical aspects of the construction details (TWRC 2007). 
However, the panel’s greatest concern related to the implementation of the wider 
masterplan. While continuously stressing their enthusiastic support for the design 
proposals, the panel made it be known that in their professional opinion the success 
of the whole project was crucial to the wider redevelopment vision and that delay 
would damage the corporation’s public credibility (Waterfront Toronto 2008). 
 
The TWRC’s ability to secure funding from the three levels of government to move 
beyond the wave decks proved difficult, despite the combined efforts of the expert 
design jury, the WDRP and the enthusiasm of local community leaders. Even though 
regulatory approval had been granted, by mid 2012 only a very small percentage of 
the Central Waterfront competition vision had been realised. The TWRC constructed 
three of the eight wave decks during 2008 and 2009 utilising the funding that was 
available3 (see Figure 6). These have proven to be a major success and have won 
numerous awards as well as enthusiastic support from local residents (CIVIL 4). The 
only other aspect to have been completed is a small phase of the waterfront public 
promenade. It was enabled by funding commitments associated with adjacent 
building projects and opened in 2010.  
 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Overshadowing the implementation of these punctuated additions to the waterfront 
has been the slow progress made on Queens Quay and the remainder of the 
waterfront promenade. Speaking in 2011, a representative from a local community 
group lamented that the excitement surrounding the 2006 showcase event had 
become a distant memory (CIVIL 4). In July 2012, however, a full six years after the 
design competition and soon after the research for this paper was completed (early 
2012), initial financing for upgrading a small section of Queens Quay Boulevard was 
secured from the three governments. The money was tied to essential streetcar track 
repairs and construction work began in Autumn 2012 and is scheduled to continue 
until 2015 (Waterfront Toronto 2013). 
                                                         
3 Each costing approximately $5 million 
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Lessons from an Innovative Urban Design Competition 
 
The motivation behind the Central Waterfront Innovative Design Competition was 
simple. The TWRC wanted to build a constituency of support for its wider waterfront 
redevelopment programme as it weathered serious financial storms. In some 
respects it was successful in doing this. It engaged local people in an ordinarily 
closed decision-making process, enlivened interest in the waterfront and elements of 
the winning design received positive press coverage and design awards. Yet in spite 
of this, financial roadblocks persisted and the innovative decision-making 
environment was undermined by protracted construction delays and lacklustre 
support from the three levels of government. Nevertheless, the impact of these 
obstructions upon the intended design vision were relatively minor and those 
elements of the West 8/DTAH proposal that have been constructed, or are scheduled 
for construction, remain consistent with the original proposal selected by the jury. 
Such an outcome is not always guaranteed during a design competition because 
new clients, and occasionally new design teams, can take over the implementation of 
a competition entry as time passes. 
 
This final section of the paper casts the Central Waterfront Innovative Design 
Competition as an example of how competition sponsors might begin to reconcile 
some of the tensions between traditional jury-based design competitions and public 
decision-making processes. It begins by underscoring the three most successful 
elements of the competition decision-making model illustrated in Figure 3 before 
exploring a series of potential strategies for increasing the public’s role in future 
design competitions. 
 
Establishing a clear competition brief: Researchers have previously identified that the 
quality of a competition brief and the ability of a design jury to make an assessment 
that is actually based on that brief, rather than the whims of jury members, remains a 
challenge during many design competitions (Eley, 1990; Volker 2010). The outcomes 
on Toronto’s waterfront were encouraging in this respect. The contextual analysis 
provided a strong foundation for the urban design principles that followed and, 
because the brief was based on previous studies of the waterfront, the integrity of 
prior public consultation exercises was also upheld. This meant that the brief became 
an authoritative guide for the competition participants. It provided the jury with a clear 
mandate as well as a thoroughgoing sense of the competition’s history and its 
subsequent goals. Moreover, the jury and the corporation ‘stuck to the brief’ when 
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assessing both the qualification and shortlisted proposals. The scope and depth of 
the brief helped to legitimatise the competition and sustain the TWRC’s commitment 
to the winning proposal throughout the many implementation hurdles that followed. 
 
Appointing an appropriate jury: The chances for digression from the competition brief 
were further alleviated by the sponsor’s purposeful selection of a broadly focused 
jury that was sympathetic to the redevelopment programme and, indeed, the 
rationale of an urban design competition (rather than a competition focused on a 
single building or object). Evidence of this was born out in the jury’s final report, 
which, in its assessment of the shortlisted entries, strongly urged the TWRC to focus 
any initial implementation efforts on the urban design vision, in the round, rather than 
the slip head design elements alone. While financing woes meant this 
recommendation could not be realised in the short-term, the jury’s intelligent 
advocacy for the project, in toto, helped the TWRC to lobby passionately and 
convincingly to the three levels of government about the need for the winning design 
proposal to be completed in its entirety and as imagined by the competition winners. 
 
Integrating opportunities for public feedback: Supporting the brief and the expert jury 
was the public participation procedure adopted during the competition. As discussed 
at the beginning of the paper, many design competitions fail to generate a successful 
dialogue between the sponsor, competitors, jury members and the final users of the 
project. Moreover, design competitions rarely incorporate structured space for public 
participation (Banerjee and Loukaitou-Siders 1990; Nasar, 1999). On Toronto’s 
waterfront the combination of stakeholder committee meetings and public exhibitions 
begins to offer a contrary perspective. Through enhanced dialogue, the sponsor and 
the design jury took into account the opinions of the general public who attended the 
exhibitions and public forum and, although this process was not entirely open – a jury 
still made the final decision – the public had a number of opportunities to assess and 
critique the competition entries. The TWRC’s design review process, as well as 
further stakeholder meetings and public forums that occurred after the formal 
competition had concluded, reinforced this approach and helped to sustain the 
competition’s struggling momentum in the face of funding delays. In addition, the 
jury, whose professional judgment was still considered crucial to legitimise the 
competition, were obliged to take public feedback into account when making their 
decision. This reduced any likelihood that the competitors would only aim to please 
the individual jury members, as experienced on past design competitions (Banerjee 
and Loukaitou-Sideris 1990), and led to a strong sense of agreement between the 
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jury and the general public about the winning entry. The process described is similar 
in scope to what Nasar (1999) has termed a Pre-Jury Evaluation (PJE). Although 
Nasar proposes a more quantitative analysis of user viewpoints than was adopted on 
Toronto’s waterfront, the general concept is similar: the opinions of those who are 
going to inhabit a building or public space should be recorded prior to the jury’s 
deliberations and directly inform the decision-making process. 
 
Strategies to Deepening the Public’s Role in Design Competitions 
 
While the Central Waterfront Innovative Design Competition offers a fresh 
perspective on how the users of the built environment might begin to play a more 
substantive role during a design competition, the process was still imperfect and 
there remain further ways in which the barriers between lay people and experts might 
be reconciled in future design competitions. Past studies of public participation on 
Toronto’s waterfront, as highlighted earlier, have also criticised the TWRC and 
preceding waterfront agencies for failing to engage a diversity of local people in the 
planning and redevelopment process (Laidley 2007; Lehrer and Laidley 2008). In a 
2008 assessment of the TWRC’s public consultation efforts, for example, Lehrer and 
Laidley argued that the corporation has engaged in “…the passive but specific 
exclusion of particular communities and groups” (796), especially those in poorer 
areas of the city. While this particular concern was not the focus of this paper, the 
strategies discussed in the following paragraphs aim to stimulate discussion about 
how the public dimension of design competitions might be improved and, ultimately, 
reach out to a broader cross-section of society. 
 
Establishing a public dialogue at the beginning of a competition: Although public 
opinion was integrated throughout the assessment of the shortlisted entries, the 
TWRC did not make the same effort to establish a dialogue with local people during 
the preceding open stage of the competition. The decision to select the five 
shortlisted teams was instead made by an internal panel of experts. While the cost of 
hosting additional public forums might have been prohibitive, the PJE stage, to use 
Nasar’s parlance, could have been extended by other means. In future competitions, 
for example, this could take the form of an interactive website onto which users might 
input initial ideas. Such a process might encourage broader interest in the 
competition while providing the jury with a deeper sense of local sentiment. The 
TWRC could have also convened the stakeholder advisory committee earlier in the 
decision-making process and used it, as it did successfully later on, as a platform to 
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discuss the design proposals in more depth. More generally, the TWRC might 
consider diversifying the composition of its stakeholder advisory committees on 
future design competitions it convenes. While the corporation has engaged admirably 
with waterfront businesses, advocacy groups and community associations, there 
remains scope for it to reach out further to community organisations in some of the 
poorer neighbourhoods located close to the waterfront which, as Lehrer and Laidley 
(2008) argue, have been notably absent from the TWRC’s otherwise encouraging 
public participation processes. 
 
Inviting a lay representative to sit on the jury: To reinforce the significance of the 
structured public engagement conducted by the TWRC during the competition, a 
representative from the stakeholder committee could have sat on the design jury. 
While in this instance the jury’s decision did appear to reflect the majority opinion of 
those who participated in the public forums, exhibitions and the stakeholder advisory 
group, the jury’s deliberations were nevertheless conducted in camera. As a result, 
the extent to which the jury based their decision on the judgment of the public 
participants versus their own expert knowledge cannot be reliably known. Appointing 
a lay representative on the design jury would provide additional monitoring and 
“decrease the communication gap often associated with competitions” (Banerjee and 
Loukaitou-Sideris 1990, 128). Furthermore, the TWRC could have also sought public 
input during the selection of jurors. Although steps were taken to create a jury with a 
diversity of design talent, the pool of candidates was still limited by the professional 
knowledge and ideologies of the experts making the jury selection on behalf of the 
corporation. 
 
Developing opportunities for post-competition participation: In some respects the 
TWRC did conduct participation after the competition. Its peer review panel reviewed 
the winning proposals on numerous occasions, regular public forums were convened 
and the stakeholder advisory committee also remained active. Nevertheless, there 
remains scope for what Nasar (1999) calls post-occupancy evaluation (POE). During 
a POE the sponsor evaluates the performance of the finished project against the 
principles contained in the competition brief. In addition, the POE could also be used 
to assess the quality of the competition decision-making process. While Nasar’s 
proposal emerges from a critical assessment of an architectural competition for a 
singular building, the role of a POE is just as relevant to competitions in urban design 
because “They can make the jury and architect more accountable for the project’s 
performance and they can improve our understanding of the actual performance of 
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these public projects” (Nasar 1999, 161). In many instances the biggest barrier to a 
POE will likely be cost. For the sponsor, conducting a reflective assessment of a 
completed project would be both expensive and time consuming, especially as many 
competitions are ‘one off’ events. On Toronto’s waterfront, however, there is a strong 
rationale for employing a POE because the TWRC has continued to use its design 
competition model on emerging public realm projects and, as a result, it remains a 
high profile component of the corporation’s wider public participation programme. In 
particular, the POE might help the corporation pinpoint a more successful means of 
seeing a project through to full implementation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented a design competition decision-making model and asserted 
that urban design competitions should incorporate more open and participatory 
decision-making. It has argued that design expertise can, and should, remain a 
distinct component of any design competition decision-making process, but posits 
that a positive balance must be struck between professional expertise and the 
diverse opinions of lay people during, before and after a design competition. The 
case of the Central Waterfront Innovative Design Competition highlighted some of 
the structured ways that participation can be integrated into a decision-making 
process and suggested a series of strategies for enhancing the public’s role in future 
design competitions, whether in Toronto or elsewhere. Although lay people did not 
directly influence the jury in their deliberations on Toronto’s waterfront, the conditions 
were established for local people to play a positive role in the competition process. 
This outcome was reinforced by the high profile nature of the public forum held in 
downtown Toronto, the extensive press coverage given to the public exhibitions and 
the coupling of the competition to the TWRC’s wider iterative public consultation 
process.  
 
While public participation is often used in different ways during various design 
competitions the research available to understand these processes is limited. More 
knowledge is needed about the competition procedures that lead to some of the most 
high profile buildings, public spaces and neighbourhoods around the world. This 
paper offers a series of lessons for practitioners in Toronto and beyond, but is also 
presented as a stepping-stone for further enquiry. Future scholarship on design 
competitions should aim to interrogate the decision-making models employed by 
both public and private institutions employing design competitions in different 
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jurisdictions and establish deeper theoretical perspectives on the relationships that 
can be forged between lay people and experts during design competitions. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Toronto’s downtown waterfront. The designated area for the Central 
Waterfront Innovative Design Competition is highlighted in grey. 
 
Figure 2. The public realm on Toronto’s waterfront. (Image 2a) The inhospitable 
street-level experience caused by the elevated Gardiner Expressway. (Image 2b) 
The treatment of the Spadina waterfront slip heads prior to the design competition 
(courtesy of Waterfront Toronto). 
 
Figure 3. The Central Waterfront Innovative Design Competition decision-making 
process. 
 
Figure 4. Renderings from the shortlisted design competition entries. (Image 4a) The 
tear-shaped pavilions proposed by the team led by Foster and Partners (courtesy of 
Waterfront Toronto). (Image 4b) The ‘cultural buoys’ proposed by the team led by 
Stan Allen (courtesy of Waterfront Toronto). (Image 4c) The series of new islands 
proposed by the team led by Tod Williams (courtesy of Waterfront Toronto). (Image 
4d) Elements of the public promenade proposed by PORT (courtesy of Waterfront 
Toronto). (Image 4e). Elements of the public promenade and boardwalk proposed by 
the West 8/DTAH team (courtesy of Waterfront Toronto). 
 
Figure 5: Renderings of the winning submission by the team led by West 8/DTAH. 
(Image 5a) Ilustration of the proposed transformation of Queens Quay into a multi-
 30 
use boulevard (courtesy of Waterfront Toronto). (Image 5b) Illustration of one of the 
proposed ‘wave decks’ (courtesy of Waterfront Toronto). 
 
Figure 6: Bathurst Wave Deck.  
